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Decentralisation of 
Environmental Regulations  
in India
Ruth Kattumuri, Stefania Lovo
The decentralisation of 
Environment Impact Assessment 
processes has improved the 
enforcement of environmental 
regulations and been successful 
in reducing polluting activities in 
India. Evidence suggests that 
decentralisation was associated 
with relatively fewer firm births in 
states with stricter environmental 
law enforcement. In such a 
scenario, the development of 
stronger collaborations between 
various stakeholders would 
enhance the enforcement of 
environmental regulations and 
reduce disparities between  
states, through knowledge and 
resource sharing, and improving 
technical, financial and 
administrative capabilities.
(Figure 1 accompanying this article is available 
on the EPW website.) 
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Environmental protection rights and duties have long been a part of the Indian Constitution. Elaborate laws 
relating to environmental protection have 
their genesis in the enactment of the Water 
Act of 1974. The central government, 
through the Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change (MOEFCC) 
and the Central Pollution Control Board 
(CPCB), is responsible for planning and 
formulating national policies and stan-
dards. The implementation and enforce-
ment are decentralised and are the re-
sponsibility of the State Pollution Control 
Boards (SPCB). On the one hand, the de-
centralisation process has the potential to 
reduce the burden on the central govern-
ment and to accelerate the approval pro-
cess. On the other, the decentralised 
powers could be futile if state govern-
ments intend to actively pursue industri-
alisation for their respective state, or be 
ineffective if state authorities lack tech-
nical and financial capacity.
Cistulli (2002) suggests that the de-
centralisation of environmental regula-
tion helps with better understanding of 
local environmental problems, to promote 
more transparent and efficient use of 
natural resources, as well as to increase 
local participation based on the homo-
geneity of common goals and priorities. 
At the same time, there could be trade-
offs on the success of any decentralisa-
tion process such as weak administra-
tive or technical capacity, lack of finan-
cial resources, poor coordination bet-
ween national and local policies and the 
risk of local elite capture (Besley and 
Coate 2003).
Environmental law compliance is some-
times seen as a barrier to business cre-
ation and expansion. Hence, it is crucial to 
strike a balance between environmental 
stringency and excessive bureaucracy 
(Upadhyay 2017). Indian citizens also 
benefit from a unique approach to the 
enforcement of environmental laws, by 
exercising their constitutional right to a 
healthy environment in the form of public 
interest litigations (PILs) before the court 
of justice. PILs have resulted in some 
environmental improvements (Kathuria 
2007) but have also contributed to the 
increase in workload of state authori-
ties because of court-ordered directives 
(OECD 2006). To overcome the challenges 
of bureaucracy, some states such as 
Jharkhand have proposed exempting 
certain industries from the requirement 
of pollution control board clearances, 
which could potentially have negative 
consequences for the environment. More 
importantly, several states are moving 
towards comprehensive online systems 
to speed up the clearance process (CII-
KPMG 2015). 
In this article, we discuss the implica-
tions of the decentralisation of environ-
mental regulation in India. We draw in-
sights from Stefania Lovo (2018), who 
investigated the impact of the 2006 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
reform on the birth of polluting firms. In 
particular, we examine whether the dif-
ferences in enforcement capacity across 
states had produced heterogeneous effects 
on the birth of polluting firms. Based on an 
environmental enforcement index con-
structed by Lovo (2018), we examine 
variations across states in India. 
EIA Reforms 
All firms in India are formally required 
to receive clearance through an EIA before 
they can start operating. The EIA also 
determines the pollution control meas-
ures to be maintained throughout the 
lifetime of the firms’ operations. A 2006 
reform of the EIA process delegated the 
responsibilities for environmental clear-
ance, previously under the control of the 
central government, to newly established 
state-level authorities for certain sectors, 
namely, the State Environmental Impact 
Assessment Authority (SEIAA). 
The EIA procedure, as modified by the 
2006 reform, is subdivided into four 
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stages. The first stage (screening) is 
aimed at determining whether a project 
requires an EIA report. The second stage 
(scoping) involves the determinants of 
terms of references covering all relevant 
environmental concerns for the prepara-
tion of the EIA. The third stage requires a 
public consultation, through both a pub-
lic hearing in the proximity of the site, 
and invitations of written responses 
from the concerned stakeholders. The 
final stage (appraisal) involves the scru-
tiny of the EIA application that can result 
in either approval or rejection of the pro-
posed project. Following the 2006 re-
form, the second and final stages were 
delegated to state-level authorities, if the 
project belonged to specific sectors and 
met certain criteria (Lovo 2018). 
Firms in certain sectors are no longer 
subject to a decision from the central au-
thority but have to apply for environ-
mental clearance to the SEIAAs. Polluting 
sectors that were not affected by decen-
tralisation and maintained centralised 
procedures are offshore; and onshore oil 
and gas exploration, development and 
production; petroleum refining; asbestos 
milling and asbestos-based products; 
soda ash industry; chemical fertilisers; 
petrochemical complexes; and integrated 
paint industry. The automobile industry 
was initially included among the polluting 
sectors subject to state-level clearance in 
the draft EIA reform, but was later removed 
from the final version of the notification 
and is currently not subject to EIA (MoEF 
2005), which seems counterproductive 
since this industry is known to be among 
the largest sources of pollution.
The EIA process was amended further 
in 2016 to address issues related to specific 
sectors through a notification. Accord-
ingly, the District Environmental Impact 
Assessment Authority (DEIAA) and Dis-
trict Level Expert Appraisal Committee 
(DEAC) are responsible for granting envi-
ronmental clearance for mining of minor 
minerals.1 The MoEFCC had published a 
draft notification,2 which provided an 
exception for existing firms that might 
be violating environmental norms. It 
suggested that projects which had initi-
ated construction activity and expansion 
prior to going through an EIA process, 
could continue their activities by agreeing 
to an Environment Supplemental Plan, 
even if they might be in violation of the 
EIA criteria. This proposal was opposed 
by civil society organisations, which ar-
gued that these proposed changes would 
allow firms to continue violating envi-
ronmental laws. This representation led 
to a revised notification.3 According to 
the 2017 notification, the government 
has established a process by which an 
Expert Appraisal Committee at the cen-
tral level would determine the conditions 
for a firm’s continued operations. We note 
that while the 2006 reform allowed for 
public consultation in the procedure for 
the evaluation of violating firms, the 
new process does not specify this categor-
ically. Public consultations have enabled 
formal representation of environmental 
concerns from communities and hence, it 
would be beneficial to make it mandato-
ry for the Expert Appraisal Committee, 
within the current framework, to under-
take public consultation before finalising 
their reports.
Enforcement across States
Environmental law enforcement varies 
substantially across Indian states due to 
variations in governance, socio-econom-
ic and political conditions but also due to 
state-specific technical and financial abili-
ties (Nandimath 2009). While environ-
mental standards for industrial pollution 
are determined by the central government, 
evidence suggests that there are large 
differences across states in terms of 
enforcement and compliance (OECD 2006; 
World Bank 2006).
Regulatory stringency is very difficult 
to measure because it is a multifaceted 
concept that no single indicator can fully 
capture. Lovo (2018) combines five dif-
ferent indicators of environmental en-
forcement into a single index. Figure 1 
(available on EPW website) plots the 
environmental enforcement index across 
states in India and shows a great degree 
of heterogeneity in terms of regulatory 
stringency. 
The individual indicators are reported 
in Table 1 and aimed at capturing state-
level differences in institutional capacity, 
civic participation and institutional 
quality that are relevant to environmental 
law enforcement. The democratic system 
in India offers the opportunity for engage-
ment and representation by the general 
public and civil society organisations, a 
reasonably free press and an accessible 
judiciary system. All these factors, to-
gether with state-level technical and in-
stitutional capacity, play an important role 
in ensuring that environmental standards 
and regulations are implemented. The 
selected indicators are highly correlated. 
Descriptive evidence suggests that state 
pollution authorities such as the SPCBs 
suffer from inadequate technical facili-
ties and skilled personnel for monitoring 
and filing charges (OECD 2006). 
Data show that greater judicial efforts 
are found in states with lower corrup-
tion. They are also in line with effective 
governance being more conducive to 
building public awareness about the 
environment as shown in Lal and Jha 
(1999). On the other hand, the legal 
system can take several years to settle a 
dispute and impose penalties (Breton 
2008). The threat of long-lasting court 
disputes can foster rent-seeking activities. 
Duflo et al (2013) suggest that consultants 
for EIAs and the regulator’s own staff may 
have incentives to under-report pollution. 
They observe that independent verifica-
tion of pollution reports through over-
lapping monitoring regimes may have 
similar effects, based on environmental 
audits. Further, in weaker enforcement 
regimes, collusion between state-level 
authorities and regulated firms can also 
become an issue. 
Birth of New Polluting Firms
In India, only registered formal sector 
firms are subject to environmental clear-
ance, since smaller, informal firms tend 
to operate outside the control of pollu-
tion control authorities. The highlighted 
differences in regulatory capacity across 
states is likely to produce notable differ-
ences in compliance costs between loca-
tions and can, therefore, affect a firm’s 
entry decision and, ultimately, the 
distribution of new polluting firms be-
tween states. Data on firms’ incorpo-
ration into the Registrar of Companies 
(Ministry of Corporate Affairs 2018) 
show a striking difference in the pat-
terns of firm births between high and 
low enforcing states in the post-reform 
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period. Figure 2 shows the evolution of 
the number of new polluting firms over 
time by level of enforcement. This anal-
ysis includes all sectors for which the EIA 
was decentralised, either for all firms or 
for firms satisfying certain criteria.
The data show that while firm births 
in low enforcement states followed pre-
reform trends, a slowdown in births is 
observed in high-enforcement states 
(line below). This compelling pattern in 
the data suggests that decentralisation 
was associated with relatively fewer 
firm births in states with stricter envi-
ronmental enforcement. Regression re-
sults confirm the negative impact of 
state-level enforcement on firm births in 
states with stricter environmental law 
enforcement. Empirical results by Lovo 
(2018) show that the overall impact is 
large—close to an overall 12% reduction 
in the number of new polluting firms. 
This is because the decrease in the num-
ber of polluting firms in high-enforce-
ment states has been substantially larg-
er, versus the increase experienced by 
low-enforcement states, due to their 
lower economic capabilities.
The effect is consistent with an in-
crease in average regulatory stringency, 
driven by states with higher levels of en-
forcement. The pre-reform EIA was con-
sidered to be relatively lax in India (Jha-
Thakur 2011) and given the anecdotal 
evidence on the proliferation of un-
checked polluting firms, the results show 
that reform has been successful in limiting 
the creation of new polluting companies. 
The results are also suggestive of an 
actual decrease in the number of new 
polluting firms rather than a switch to 
informality that would, instead, imply no 
gains in terms of environmental benefits 
(Lovo 2018).
Discussion and Recommendations
India’s commitment to environmental 
protection and regulatory enforcement 
has grown incrementally in the last 10 
years (Kini et al 2017). Our findings indi-
cate that the decentralisation process 
has led to an increase in the average 
regulatory stringency and has been suc-
cessful in reducing the number of pol-
luting activities. The effects are varied 
between states, wherein the majority of 
the high-enforcement states have accrued 
environmental benefits, while more 
needs to be done in other states. If the 
regulatory gap between low- and high-
enforcement states is maintained, the 
reform could, however, potentially trigger 
opportunistic behaviour by states with 
lower economic development, where 
lower regulatory enforcement could be 
aimed at attracting new polluting indus-
tries (Figure 3, p 36). While the economic 
gains could be substantial, the health 
Table 1: Environmental Enforcement Measures and Construction of the Enforcement Index
Rank State Index Non-governmental Judgments Corruption Articles Stations 
   Organisations 
1 Delhi 2.48 22 2 11 166 11
2 Andhra Pradesh 2.14 29 4 4 213 21
3 Tamil Nadu 1.80 29 2 12 443 16
4 Maharashtra 1.69 26 4 5 165 42
5 Uttar Pradesh 0.94 24 4 10 111 35
6 Gujarat 0.81 7 4 3 146 20
7 Karnataka 0.66 17 3 17 247 14
8 Odisha 0.41 17 3 9 8 12
9 Himachal Pradesh 0.26 4 2 2 3 11
10 Kerala 0.17 7 0 1 155 16
11 West Bengal 0.14 15 2 8 120 21
12 Madhya Pradesh -0.06 12 4 18 43 26
13 Punjab -0.95 1 1 7 25 15
14 Haryana -1.29 3 1 13 21 5
15 Chhattisgarh -1.31 3 0 6 4 9
16 Rajasthan -1.33 12 0 16 6 18
17 Bihar -1.37 2 3 20 13 2
18 Assam -1.49 7 0 15 9 12
19 Jammu & Kashmir -1.83 6 0 19 3 3
20 Jharkhand -1.89 2 0 14 5 6
- Chandigarh   2 2   4 5
- Goa   0 0   13 3
- Meghalaya   1 0   0 2
- Puducherry   1 0   2 3
- Uttarakhand   4 1   2 2
The column header indicates the name of the variable. The given data refer to pre-reform (2006) conditions. The index 
was computed using all variables divided by state population, except corruption, to account for differences in size. For the 
original sources of the data, please refer to Lovo (2018).
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Figure 2: Impact of the Reform on the Number of New Polluting Firms
High-enforcement states 
(2006): Delhi, Andhra Pradesh, 
Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Uttar 
Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka
Low-enforcement states 
(2006): Haryana, Chhattisgarh, 
Rajasthan, Bihar, Assam, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Jharkhand
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The data is derived from the authors’ calculation based on the Registrar of Companies of the Indian Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs (2018). The plots are based on three-year moving averages. The number of new firms is divided based on 2006 
values so that a value of 1.3, for example, indicates an increase in firm births of 30% with respect to 2006. The shaded area 
indicates that SEIAA were progressively created in different states after 2006, mostly within two years from the reform. The 
first SEIAA was created in West Bengal in April 2007 and the last was instituted in December 2012 in Jharkhand.
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and environmental consequences could 
also be considerable (Zivin and Neidell 
2013). This has important implications 
for EIA regulation, which should take 
into consideration the disparities in en-
vironmental enforcement across states 
in any future amendments. The centre 
could also be involved in enabling know-
ledge sharing of best practices bet ween 
states, as well as in capacity building for 
resource constrained states to develop 
technical, financial and administrative 
performance. Without addressing the 
technical, financial and administrative 
needs of different states, increased 
 environmental stringency could trans-
late into excessive bureaucratic burden 
on firms. 
The ultimate goal for stricter EIA and 
environmental enforcement through 
rigorous pollution control is improving 
environmental quality. Our analysis of 
the relationship between environmental 
enforcement index and environmental 
quality in Figure 4 clearly shows that, 
states with stricter enforcement enjoy 
better air quality (top-right panel). Our 
analysis shows that in spite of a high 
enforcing index, Delhi (with highest gross 
domestic product per capita in India) 
has low air quality. The reasons for low 
air quality in Delhi include automobile 
emissions, industrial pollution, garbage 
dumps, inadequate infrastructure, geo-
graphic location including pollution from 
burning agricultural waste and forest in 
nearby regions. Environmental decen-
tralisation could play a key role in form-
ing regulations tailored according to the 
requirements and conditions of specific 
states and cities. Collaborations between 
private and public sectors can also play an 
important role (Kattumuri and Kurian 
2017). The EIA and SEIAA, together with 
the SPCB, could do more to regulate pollu-
tion in Delhi and other eight Indian cities 
which are among the most polluted cities 
in the world based on particulate matter 
(PM) 2.5 levels, according to the World 
Health Organization (World Economic 
Forum 2018).
Administrative processes remain to act 
as bottlenecks. As reported by the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey (World Bank 
2014), about 12% of firms report tax ad-
ministration and business licensing and 
permits as major obstacles to business, 
preceded by corruption (20%) and inad-
equate electricity supply (15%). Hence, 
further improvements are required in 
administration processes. 
Following are six recommendations 
toward enhancing environmental regu-
lation in India. (i) The decentralisation 
of EIA processes has improved environ-
mental regulation and has been success-
ful in reducing polluting activities in 
India. The evidence suggests that decen-
tralisation was associated with relatively 
fewer firm births in states with stricter 
environmental enforcement. The EIA, 
SEIAA and SPCBs should collaborate and 
enhance enforcement of environmental 
regulations to reduce disparities between 
states. Developing stronger centre–state, 
intra- and interstate collaborations would 
be beneficial for knowledge and resource 
sharing and improving technical, finan-
cial and administrative capabilities across 
states. (ii) A critical evaluation of all 
high polluting firms should be under-
taken in order to assess and accordingly 
include all relevant firms into the regu-
latory process. With an increasingly up-
ward economically mobile population 
and growing consumption levels, it is 
Figure 3: Environmental Law Enforcement and State-level Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita
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The graph shows the relationship between the environmental index in Table 1 and residual air quality, obtained by 
computing the residuals of a regression of Respirable Suspended Particulate Matter (RSPM) (sourced from https://data.gov.
in/) with GDP per capita.
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Figure 4: Environmental Law Enforcement and Air Pollution by State
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essential to reassess the inclusion of 
all relevant industries, including the 
 automobile industry, for the EIA pro-
cess. Regular monitoring and reporting 
should be mandatory. (iii) Having pro-
gressed 30 places in the “Ease of Doing 
Business,” India is ranked 100th among 
190 countries by the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Report, 2018. The country 
should improve its ease of doing busi-
ness further, together with enhancing 
compliance with environmental laws by 
companies. (iv) It is necessary to en-
hance responsible and effective gover-
nance and judicial processes to be more 
conducive to improve the implementa-
tion of regulations. (v) Ensuring public 
consultations and representations and 
engagement with civil society and allied 
organisations would be beneficial for 
ensuring compliance with regulations. 
(vi) In any future reforms, it would be 
beneficial to consider extending EIA pro-
cesses to be applicable to small and me-
dium enterprises, as it can contribute 
greatly towards achieving India’s goals 
for environmental sustainability. As India 
enhances its commitment to environ-
mental sustainability through techno-
logical advancements and processes, the 
country is well placed to progress fur-
ther in ensuring the highest standards of 
environmental regulations. 
Notes
1  As per the notification S.O. 147 (E) dated 
15 January 2016.
2  As per the notification S.O. 1705(E) dated 
10 May 2016.
3  As per notification S.O. 804(E), issued by the 
MOEFCC on 14 March 2017.
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EX
PA
NS
IO
N EPWRF India Time Series
(www.epwrfits.in)
 State-wise Agricultural Statistics 
The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF) has added State-wise 
data to the Agricultural Statistics module of its online database, India Time Series (ITS). 
State-wise time series starts from 1960–61, depending upon data availability, and covers:
● Area, Production and Yield (APY): Foodgrains, Oil seeds, Fibre crops, Spices, 
Horticulture crops, Plantation crops and Other crops
● Land-by-Use and Area under Irrigation (source-wise and crop-wise)
● Production and Use of Agricultural Inputs: Fertilisers and Electricity
● Procurement of Foodgrains
● Livestock Statistics: Production and Per Capita Availability of Milk, Eggs, Fish, 
Meat and Wool
● Livestock Population: Rural and Urban areas
● Value of Output from Agriculture and Allied Activities, with different base years
Following statistics have been added to the All-India data series:
● Minimum Support Prices (MSP) of Crops
● Livestock Population: Rural and Urban areas
The EPWRF ITS has 17 modules covering a range of macroeconomic, financial and 
social sector indicators on the Indian economy.
For more details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
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Figure 1: Variation in Environmental Law Enforcement across States
The map plots the environmental enforcement index for states based on data from Lovo (2018). Darker shades of red 
indicate stricter environmental enforcement. For some states, in grey, the index could not be computed due to lack of data.
(.9, 2.4)
(.2, .9)
(-1.4, .2)
(-1.8, -1.4)
No data
